FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Precedence: ROUTINE	Date: 04/23/2012	
	To: Washington Field Attr New York	CY-4 CY-2, SA	o6
	From: Washington Field CY4/NVRA Contact:	A (Main/Sub)	57C
	Approved By: Je Offish	Closed: C4 / C5 / C6 Class & Alpha 2008-WF	
	Drafted By:	CPI Codes (1) CPINT - C 41251	
	Case ID #: (Pending)	PI/ Full b Begins/_/ Expires/_/	57E
	Title: UGNAZI; TEAM-DIVERSITY; DC.GOV - VICTIM; COMPUTER INTRUSION - CRIMINAL	Assign to	
	Synopsis: Request captioned matter k writer.	be opened and assigned to the	
	Details: The purpose of this EC is to be opened and assigned to the writer based on information received from the organization, Government of District	This matter is predicated ne complainant/victim	
1	On 4/20/2012, WFO CY-4 rece DC's website, DC.gov, was under attace Chief Technology Officer, Officer (OCTO), Government of the Dis St. NW, Washington, DC 20001, telephotelephone the same day. repounder Distributed Denial of Service 6:45pm, 25 hours into the attack, OCT website and contained the DDOS attack intrusions into DC government's computed intrusions into DC government's computed writer an email contained pospostings, postings at Pastebin.com, adversity.net. Within the twitter postings and "UGNazi @UGNazi", and	eived information that the ck. Writer talked to Effice of the Chief Technology strict of Columbia, 441 4th one number: Orted DC.gov website was (DDOS) attack since 4/18/2012 TO was able to restore the c. OCTO did not detect any atter network. Esible perpetrators' twitter and a link to team- ostings, user account Claimed	⊳6 ⊳7C
	taking down DC, New York City, and NA	ASDAQ websites. The twitter*	

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Re: Washington Field From: Washington Field Re: 04/23/2012	b7E
postings included a link to Pastebin.com posting which revealed DC city mayor Vincent C Gray's personal identification information (PII).	
On 4/20/2012, writer talked to DC Metropolitan Police Department Task Force Office telephone number: via telephone. stated the MPD was aware of the leak of DC Mayor's PII. The leaked PII was not accurate and some were outdated.	ь6 ь7с
Open source search on and "UGNazi @UGNazi"revealed two hacker group UGNazi, with website at UGNazi.com, and Team Diversity at team-diversity.net. UGNazi members were Team Diversity members were	ь6 ь7с
ACS search on revealed he is the subject of New York field office's case, case number UGNAZI. In serial 40, identified as following:	b6 b7C b7E
True Name: Alias: Monikers:	b6 b7C
Address: (current) DOB:	
SSN: Email:	
ICQ: MSN: Skype:	
Twitter: Website:	
Based on the information above, WFO request that a Full Investigation be opened and assigned to SA	b6 b7С

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Re: 04/23/2012

b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

NEW YORK

AT CY2

Read and clear.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Date of transcription 04/24/2012	
•	On 4/24/2012, Chief Technology Officer, Office of the Chief Technology Officer (OCTO), Government of the District of Columbia. 441 4th St. NW, Washington. DC 20001, telephone number: email: was interviewed in Washington, D.C. Also present during the interview were email address: telephone number: cell phone number: After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, provided the following information: provided two CDs, one contained PCAP files and graphs from Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack from 4/18/2012 to 4/19/2012, and the other contained the firewall logs from that attack. stated the personal information on DC Mayor was not accurate and it was not the result of any computer intrusions in DC government network. DC government has not discover any other DC government employee's personal information was published on the internet.	
	introduced writer to Security Operations, Office of the Chief Technology Officer, telephone number: email: is the point of contact for any technical questions regarding the DDOS attack.	
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Invest		
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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE	Date: 05/01/2012	
To: Washington Field Attn:	CY4	
From: Washington Field CY4/NVRA Contact:		b6 b7C
Contact: Approved By: Drafted By: 1j	Trans.	Die
Case ID #: Pending)	5/1/2012	b7E
Title: UGNAZI - UGNAZI; TEAM-DIVERSITY DC GOV - VITIM; COMPUTER INTRUSION - CRIMINAL	(;	
Synopsis: Documenting finding on		b6 b7C
Details: On 5/1/2012, writer found a tand who is told contact him at on dc.gov website.	is a reporter from	
A Google search using on email email listed ins DOX information website that link the Comcast email according to the control of the co	n, revealed the following	ь6 ь7С
Additional searches revealed	the following information:	
The third return result in Go search returns was titled "Hack Forums GT: stfu" and located at www.hackforum Marketplace > Gametags. The excerpt in included the following text, "05-20-201 Proof: Spoiler (Click to View). [Image: XBLTime.]	- {Team Diversity} Selling ns.net > Hack Forums > the search return 11, 3:39 PM. GT Control	b 6

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Re: Washington Field From: Washington Field 05/01/2012
A post made to codeupload.com (codeuploade.com/4851) on 23 December 2011 at 5:15 pm UTC advertising stated the following information.
5 6. Team Diversity Gamertags 7. Team Diversity 8. Team Diversity 9. http://www.youtube.com/watch?tv=bWzJZEjxH9q The referenced YouTube post was no longer available at the time of the open source searches.
An AOL LiveStream profile using the moniker contained the following, "ADD on May 12 at 5:05 pm and "Selling Diversity Booter 300+ shells onlu \$10" on Jan 20 at 5:54 PM.
An Xbox Live Profile (live.xbox.com/en-US/Profile?gametag=my bolt action) lists in the BIO section the following information, "Team Diversity - and "AIMs: YouTube.com.

Writer intended to subpoena registration information on these email accounts and request search warrants as well.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 05/01/2012
To: Washington Field Attn: CY4
From: Washington Field CY4/NVRA Contact:
Approved By: CS OS
Approved By: cs os of 25/2 Drafted By: 1j 5/1/2012
Case ID #: Pending)
Title: UGNAZI - UGNAZI; TEAM-DIVERSITY; DC GOV - VITIM; COMPUTER INTRUSION - CRIMINAL
Synopsis: Documenting email communication with New York office.
Details: On 4/27/2012, writer received a email from SSA regarding terminating the lead to Los Angeles to interview
possible suspect in order to avoid operational conflict with the FBI New York investigation. Writer will continue all other logical investigative steps to move case forward.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Preceden	ice: ROUTINE		Date:	04/23/2012	
New Min	shington Field VYork neapolis enix	Attn: SA Attn: SSA Attn: SSA Attn: SSA Attn: SSA			ь6 ь7С
From: W	Washington Field ID-3, CY-4/NVRA/3E Contact: IA		,		ь6 ь7с
Approved	l By:	JUDB 5131 3 \$5 07/0	Z812		БЛС
Drafted	By:	jtab	AB 41	24/2012	
Case ID	#: 174C-MP-74385 (Pendi	ng) - 15	1/2	-9/2012	b7E
	UGNAZI - UGNAZI; TEAM-DIV DC GOV - VICTIM; COMPUTER INTRUSION - CRI				
	UNSUB(s): AKA AKA AKA CHASKA POLICE DEPARTMENT, 02/22/2012, TELEPHONE BOMB THREATS	, (VICTIM)			ъ6 ъ7с

Synopsis: (U) To document open source searches revealing DDoS, hacking and doxing activity by members of the UGNazi Hacktivist Group.

Enclosure(s): Print-outs of referenced web pages will be maintained to the captioned investigation's case file via 1A.

(U//E000) By way of background, Washington Field Office (WFO) squad CY-4 opened the captioned investigation into the hacktivist group "UGNAZI" in April 2012 based on the group's claims of responsibility for online attacks targeting computer network infrastructure belonging to the District of Columbia

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Re: 04/23/2012
(Reference for details). Open source searches for UGNAZI and the following identified group members
revealed the following information. (U) A 19 April 2012 post to the "UGNaziNews" (twitter.com/#!/UGNaziNews)Twitter feed, hereafter referred to as UGNaziNews Twitter, by hereafter referred to as stated,
The hyperlinked text ending in linked to an image at the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) that displayed a web page not available error message for nyc.gov. The hyperlinked text ending in linked to an image at the URL that displayed a web page not available error for dc.gov. (U) A 19 April 2012 post to the UGNaziNews Twitter feed by
The hyperlinked URL linked to a news story about the Hacker Group UGNazi conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against dc.gov and nyc.gov as an act of protest against the US Government.
(U) A 19 April 2012 post to the UGNaziNews Twitter feed by stated. The hyperlinked text ending in linked to an image at the URL that displayed a web page not available error for washington.org.
The hyperlinked pastebin URL linked to a pastebin post that contained Personal Identifying Information (PII) for Washington DC Mayor Vincent Gray; including Date of Birth (DOB), Social Security Number (SSN), phone numbers and addresses.
(U) A 19 April 2012 post to the UGNaziNews Twitter feed by stated. The hyperlinked

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Re: 04/23/2012
URL linked to an image at that displayed a web page not available error for masdaq.com.
(U) A 20 April 2012 post to the UGNaziNews Twitter feed by stated,
hyperlinked URL linked to an image atthat displayed a web page not available error for
(U) A 20 April 2012 post to the UGNaziNews Twitter feed by stated,
The hyperlinked URL linked to an image at that displayed a web page not available error for wa.gov.
(U) A 23 April 2012 post to the UGNaziNews Twitter feed by stated,
The hyperlinked pastebin URL linked to pastebin post that contained a message apparently protesting the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act - H.R. 3523 and listing the following pastebin URLs under the claim.
The post goes on to claim to release a U.S. District court order for at the URL
(U) The hyperlinked URL linked to a pastebin post made in apparent retaliation for law enforcement actions against LulzSec members
and in protest of
UGNazi member claimed to have and listed alleged FBI.gov server details, FBI Intranet vulnerabilities, and d0xed 7
FBI agents allegedly involved in brining down LulzSec. The 7 alleged FBI agents d0xed in the post were:
The d0x listed credit card numbers,

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Re: 04/23/2012
addresses did not conform to the format used by FBI email accounts used on either unclassified or classified networks.
(U) FBI intranet directory searches on the names of aforementioned d0xed agents did not return BPMS directory listings for FBI employees; with the exception of which returned information on a whose work telephone number indicated he works out of
(U) The hyperlinked linked to a pastebin post that listed PII for 5 alleged "CIA Field Agents". The post claimed the PII was obtained by hacking cia.gov email accounts.
(U) A 23 April post to the UGNaziNews Twitter feed by the the Twitter profile , hereafter referred to as Twitter, stated, "#FBI Document leaked - The hyperlinked pastebin URL linked to the aforementioned pastebin post tweeted by
(U) A 23 April 2012 post to the UGNaziNews Twitter feed by stated.
that displayed a web not available error tor cla.gov.
(U) A 23 April post to the UGNaziNews Twitter feed by the owner/operator of the UGNazi Twitter profile hereafter referred to as the UGNazi Twitter, stated.
(U) A 23 April 2012 post to the UGNazi Twitter feed by the the Twitter account hereafter referred to as
By The hyperlinked URL linked to a post that contained a 19 page (when printed) list of PII for and his family, as well as what appeared to be content of email messages in which indicates that he "swatted" people.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field	
Re: 04/23/2012	b7E
(#Z) #Z	b6
(U) The dox contained a URL to an image at	b7C
which displayed what appeared to be the	
contact page for an online bank account or credit card account	
manager for an account belonging to	
Based on the location of the URL in the	
d0x, right below s Visa credit card information, it	
is assessed with medium confidence that this screen shot image	
may be for an account manager page tied to that credit card.	
(m//mawa) = 120	b 6
(U/) An ACS search revealed a connection between	b7C
and a series of telephonic bomb threats being investigated by FBI	
Minneapolis Division (See for details).	b7E
	b6
(U//FOVO) The following emails listed in the d0x were	ь7С
run as search terms in ACS. The search yielded one positive	270
result for the email The serial documented	
open source derived information which tied the email account to	
the name which is very similar to the alias	
listed in the UGNazi d0x of See 174C-MP-74385,	
serial 9 for details). The d0x also lists as	
s AOL Instant Messenger ID which is consistent with	b7E
references to documented to	D/E
•	
•	
<u>'</u>	
(U//2000)	b6
7	b7C
	b7E
(U) The d0x is further corroborated by a YouTube	b6
profile for that	b7C
contained the following comments dealing with swatting:	
construction divide rationarish commercial accuration at the chief chief the	

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b6 b7C b7E

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Re: 04/23/2012
Analysis:
(U/FOVO) It is assessed with high confidence that the UGNazi hacktivist group did not compromise FBI or CIA employee email accounts as claimed in the aforementioned d0xing posts and NYO
ADIC letter post made by UGNazi members to pastebin. This assessment is based on the following indicators that suggest the FBI d0xing information and the NYO ADIC letter were fabrications.
•
•
•
•
(U//FOUQ) It is assessed with medium to high confidence that the dox published by the UGNazi hacktivist group targeting
is true information possibly obtained by UGNazi members through the compromise of one or more of the email accounts listed in the d0x. This assessment is based upon the
preponderance of corroborating information listed below.

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(U//F000) Based on the aforementioned details corroborating the dox it is assessed with medium confidence that one or more members of the UGNazi hacktivist group are capable (both in motivation and skill level) of committing computer network intrusion and/or social engineering resulting in the compromise of online password protected accounts.

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To: Re:	Washington	From: 4/23/20	Washington 12	Field
Numb Type ITU:	: SUBJECT	ŝ		
,	SSN: Name: Squad:			

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Re: 04/23/2012
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)
NEW YORK
AT NEW YORK, NY
For New York Field Office Squad CY-2's situational awareness. Read and clear.
Set Lead 2: (Info)
MINNEAPOLIS
AT MINNEAPOLIS, MN
For Minneapolis Field Office Squad CT-3's situational awareness. See the information regarding the possible true identity of and alleged evidence of swatting activity documented on pages 4 - 6 of the enclosed communication. The full text of the report are enclosed in the accompanying 1A. Read and clear.
Set Lead 3: (Info)
PHOENTX

AT PHOENIX, AZ

For Phoenix Field Office Squad C-2's situational awareness regarding d0xing victims and possible case subject residing in Phoenix's AOR. Read and clear.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE		Date: 05/11/2012			
To: Cyber	Attn:	SSA SSA	b6 b7		
To: Charlotte To: Dallas To: Houston To: Los Angeles To: Little Rock To: New York	Attn: Attn: Attn: Attn: Attn: Attn:	SSA SSA SSA Cyber SSA CY-1 SSA SSA			
From: Washington Field CY-4/NVRA/Room 3 Contact:	7 320		Ь6 Ь7		
Approved By:	KCB \$5/11/24	वार	2.		
Drafted By:	kcb				
Case ID #			ь7		
Title: UGNAZI; TEAM DIVERSITY; DC.GOV - VICTIM; COMPUTER INTRUSION	- CRIMINAL				
Synopsis: To document not Special Agent (SA)		liaison contact mad	e with b6		
Attachment: E-mail communi	cation from S stributed den				
Details: On 05/11/2012,SSA contacted SSA via UNET e- mail advising of a DDoS attack of the web page apparently conducted by members of "UGNazı", including individuals utilizing the monikers respectively. b6 b7c b7E					
On this same dat SSA advised	e, via e-mail	and telephone conve	of this b6		
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To: Cyber From: Washington Field Re: 05/11/2012	b7E
possible DDoS. SA later confirmed their web site had in fact been DDoSed but was now currently up and running. SA is	b6 b7с b7Е
prosecutive opinion. SA advised he may once	b 5
he has a better understanding of the incident. SA advised the had network infrastructure at three locations including	b6 b7С
SA further advised through open source research he identified Twitter feeds of individuals claiming responsibility for the DDoS of his organization WF will continue coordination efforts with the on this matter.	b7E
On 05/11/2012, SSA forwarded a copy of the attached e-mail thread related to this incident to all identified field offices with potential equities in this matter for their situational awareness	ь6 ь7с

To:	Cyber From:	Washington Field	
Re:		05/11/2012	
			1

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Set Lead 1: (Info)

CYBER

AT WASHINGTON, DC

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

For information.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

DALLAS

AT DALLAS, TX

For information.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

HOUSTON

AT HOUSTON, TX

For information.

To: Cvber From: Washington Field Re: 05/11/2012

b7E

Set Lead 5: (Info)

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CA

For information.

Set Lead 6: (Info)

LITTLE ROCK

AT LITTLE ROCK, AR

For information.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

NEW YORK


AT NEW YORK, NY

For information.

	<u> </u>
From: Sent: To:	Friday, May 11, 2012 10:45 AM
Cc:	
Subject:	FW:
See the below re a comembers of UGNazi to infrastructure in the locations and which w	include My OIG POC advised they had
SSA FBI/WFO/NVRA/CY-4 (D) (C) 703.686.6010 (F)	
From: Sent: Friday, May 11, To: Subject: RE:	
will update you.	tney get a better handle on the incident. Once they get back to me i
FBI/WFO/NVRA/CY-4 (D) (C) 703.686.6010 (F)	
From: Sent: Friday, May 11, To: Cc:	
Subject: Re	
	1

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, **,** ,



I am a Cyber Squad Supervisor in the WF Office and the is in my AOR. I appreciate any information you have on the subjects involved in the	b 7
I can be reached @ and BB Thanks in advance for your assistance.	b6 b7
From: Criginal Message	b6
To: Cc:	b7 b7
Sent: Fri May 11 07:51:38 2012 Subject: Re:	
Please see below in regards to a DDoS attack attributed to	b6
	b'
From:	be
To: Cc: Sent: Thu May 10 23:12:11 2012	b'
Subject: b6 b7c	
is currently down due to DDoS attack by and members of UGNazi to include I believe I have PII for to include name and home address. Can you provide contact info for the agent looking into	b'
at the office and I will be out until May 21.	b71
Twitter accounts for individuals captioned above are:	be
	b'
I'll keep you updated as info comes in.	
	b6 b7

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE	Date: 05/07/2012
To: Washington Field Attn: 0	CY-4
From: Washington Field CY4/NVRA Contact:] .
Approved By: 4 05/03/61C	. / /
Drafted By:	5/1/2012
Case ID #: Pending)	
Title: UGNAZI - UGNAZI; TEAM-DIVERSITY; DC GOV - VICTIM; COMPUTER INTRUSION - CRIMINAL	
Synopsis: Requesting a STATS sub file to	be opened.

Details: Writer requesting a STATS sub file to be opened under captioned case in order to record all the statistical accomplishments.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

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In Reply, Please Refer to File No.	Northern Virginia Resident Agency 9325 Discovery Blvd. Manassas, VA 20109				
	May 2, 2012				
Long Beach Police Department Computer Crimes Detail					
RE: Distributed Denial of Service from 4/18/2012 to 4/19/2012.	(DDOS) attack on DC.gov website				
Dear Detective					
On 4/20/2012, the FBI Washington Field Office received information that the DC's website, DC.gov, was under DDOS attack. FBI Special Agent (SA)					
	, claimed taking down DC				
government, New York City, and NAS posting between reporter from dcist.com, tol him at dc.gov website. Further search in link to Pastebin.com posting which Gray's personal identification inf	DAO websites. In a twitter who is a dto contact to discuss the DDOS attacks on twitter postings revealed a posted DC city mayor Vincent C				
On 4/20/2012, writer tal Department Task Force Office number: via telephon aware of the leak of DC Mayor's PI accurate and some information were	I. The leaked PII was not				
Internet search on					
revealed two hacker group UGNazi.com, and Team Diversity at listed its members as					

Team-Diversity.net listed its members as
,
Following items are attached to this Letter: a CD contained screen shots of twitter postings and online articles regarding DDOS attack on DC.gov, a CD contained PCAP file, and a CD contained firewall log on DDOS attack.
The above information is provided to you for action as deemed appropriate. Ouestions regarding this matter can be directed to SA Squad CY-4 (located at the Northern Virginia Resident Agency),
Sincerely,
Ronald T Hosko
Special Agent in Charge
By: Supervisory Special Agent

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: ROUTINE	Date: 05/15/2012	
To: Washington Field Attn:	CY4	
From: Washington Field CY4/NVRA Contact:]	
Approved By: 8 05 16/2012	15/20/2	
Drafted By:lj 🖔 🖔	15/20/2	
Case ID #: Pending)	•	
Title: UGNAZI - UGNAZI; TEAM-DIVERSITY; DC GOV - VITIM; COMPUTER INTRUSION - CRIMINAL		
Synopsis: Documenting finding on		
Details: On 5/2/2012, FBI Task Force Of Police Department Sgt. cand provided following information:	ficer (TFO), Long Bea ontacted writer via em	ch ail
computer related crimes by the Long Beac (LBPD) and is due in court later in May positively identified and search warrant of his computers are in LBPD custody. T	2012. He has been s have been served. S he handling LBPD ne number: and his friends.	Some
DOB: Cell phone: Address:		
Subjects Mother:	<u>.</u>	
Address: Employer: Work Phone: Cell:	,	

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Re: 05/15/2012
On 5/3/2012, TFO contacted writer via email and provided a list of the subjects who were identified by Detective The following list was compiled from the SWATTING and ID theft case Detective is investigating:
AKA: Name: DOB: M/W Address:
Home: Mom: Cell: AIM: Twitter:
YouTube: (videos show DDoS of TacoBell.com and theft of Xbox game tags.) Web page: (Possibly contains virus) Site shows members are
Notes: I have several PayPal transactions regarding the purchase of VPN accounts. Search warrant served on residence in November 2011 and computers taken.
AKA: Name: DOB:
M/W Address: AIM: Notes:
Due to the subject being vears old at the time, no case was filed.
AKA: Name DOB:

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Re: 05/15/2012	b7E
Address: Home: AIM: Notes:	b6 b7C b7E
AKA: Name DOB: CDL: Cell M/W Address: AIM: Notes:	ъ6 ъ7с
AKA: Name: DOB: Address: Home: Cell: AIM: Notes:	b6 b7С
AKA: Name: DOB: Address: AIM: Notes:	ъ6 ъ7с
AKA: Name DOB: Lives with: Address:	ь6 ь7с

b7E

b6 b7С

b6 b7С

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field Re: 05/15/2012
Home: AIM: ISP: Notes:
AKA: Name: DOB: M/W Address: Notes:
AKA: Name DOB: M/W Address: Home AIM: Notes:
AKA: name DOB: M/W AIM: Notes:
AKA: Name DOB: Male Address: AIM: Notes:

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Re:	, 05/15/2012	ngcon rieid	
Los Ang	5/4/2012, writer receiveles Division. A copy	of LBPD report on	was
attached to t	the email. The LBPD rep	port was prepared by Det	<u>e</u> ctive
an	nd it detailed the inves	stigation conducted for	

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(Rev. 05-01-2008)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 05/15/2012
To: Baltimore Attn: Cyber Squad
From: Washington Field CY4/NVRA Contact:
Approved By: Cs ØS/17/2Ø12. Drafted By: (Pending)
Drafted By: 1j U, 5/15/2012
Case ID # (Pending)
Title: UGNAZI; TEAM-DIVERSITY; DC GOV - VICTIM; COMPUTER INTRUSION - CRIMINAL
Synopsis: Request concurrence from Baltimore Field Office to conduct interview in Annapolis, MD.
Details: On 4/20/2012, Washington Filed Office (WFO) CY-4 received information that the DC's website, DC.gov, was under Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. During the course of the investigation, writer determined the members of hacker group UGNazi and Team Diversity were behind attack. Group member DOB: address:
were positively identified
by Long Beach Police Department (LBPD) during their investigation. LBPD provided WFO with information on as well as several
The following individual
resides in
AKA: Name DOB: M/W
Address:
Home: AIM: Notes:

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To: Re:	Baltimore		Washington 05/15/2012	Field		
		the DI	ends to inter OoS attack ago		ermine	

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Re: Baltimore From	: Washington Field 05/15/2012	
Set Lead 1: (Info)	1	
BALTIMORE		
	AT CYBER SOUAD	
Annapolis, MD to int	Requesting concurrence to travel to erview	

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 05/18/2012
To: Washington Field Attn: SA CY-04
From: New York CY-02 Contact: SA
Approved By:
Drafted By:
Case ID #:
Title: OPERATION CARDSHOP
UGNAZI - UGNAZI; TEAM-DIVERSITY; DC GOV - VITIM; COMPUTER INTRUSION - CRIMINAL
Synopsis: To request Washington Field to delay contact with individuals associated with UG Nazi.
Administrative: The following was emailed on May 17, 2012 as a follow up to a phone conversation.
From: Sent: Thursday, May 17, 2012 2:29 PM To: Cc:
Subject: RE: interviews
Good afternoon
I appreciate the heads up regarding the information below. As per our phone conversation, please wait until the coordinated takedown, scheduled for June 26, 2012, to contact these guys.
We are unfamiliar with at the moment, but is a registered member of our UC forum. Many of the UG guys have

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To: Washington Field From: New York Re: 05/18/2012
direct connection with our UC forum and it will not be advisable to approach them prior to June 26.
Lastly,is out of the office and will be back on Monday. He'll work on getting those logs to you next week.
Thanks!
From: Sent: Thursday, May 17, 2012 8:42 AM
To: Cc: Subject: interviews
Hey quys, I got a list of names from long beach pd det Those are the ppl Det identified in his investigation into and they associated with online. I notice there are couple of guys live close by to dc, would like to interview them regarding their role in DC.gov attack and any other illegal activities. Just want to be a team player and make sure not stepping over each other. Oh by the way, did you get chance to sent out those logs from NY.gov and NASDAQ.com attacks? thanks
AKA: Name DOB: M/W Address:
Home: AIM: Notes:
AKA: Name DOB: M/W Address:
Home: AIM: Notes:

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lay contact	York respectfully requests Washington Field to with the individuals associated with UGNazi, to members mentioned above.
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ro:	Washington	Field	From:	New	York
Re:	7	0:	5/18/20	12	

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, DC

New York respectfully requests Washington Field to delay contact with the individuals associated with UGNazi, to include the members mentioned above.

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Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 05/22/2012
To: Washington Field Attn: CY-4
From: Washington Field CY4/NVRA Contact:
Approved By: KCB \$5/24/2012 Drafted By: :1j \$ /22/20/2
Drafted By: :1j 5/22/20/2
Case ID #: Pending) (Pending)
Title: UGNAZI - UGNAZI; TEAM-DIVERSITY; DC GOV - VICTIM; COMPUTER INTRUSION - CRIMINAL
Synopsis: Reporting investigation conducted.
Details: From 5/2/2012 to 5/18/2012, through twitter postings by at and third party reporting, writer learned hacker group UGNazi was involved in attacks on IC3.gov, ed.gov, Washington Military Department website, ca.gov, Government of Anguilla (gov.ia), visa.com, cia.gov, wtf.com, Discover.com.
Pertaining to attack on wtf.com, information indicated UGNazi hacked its registration information. Writer did a Domaintools lookup on wtf.com and find following as the registration information:
Registrant: UGNazi, Inc. ATTN WTF.COM care of Network Solutions PO Box 459 Drums, PA. US 18222 Administrative Contact, Technical Contact:
Guardia 2 4005 00 40
Created: 1995-08-12 Expires: 2019-08-11 Updated: 2012-05-17

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Fo: Washington Field From: Washington Field Re: 05/22/2012	
Writer contacted Investigator at Network Solutions, telephone number: fax number: 703-668-5959,	
via telephone on 5/22/2012. confirmed that wtf.com i registered through Network Solutions; the real registrant information and domain management account login information are available upon request through a subpoena.	

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 05/24/2012				
To: Washington Field Attn: CY-4				
From: Washington Field CY4/NVRA Contact:				
Approved By: Drafted By: 1j 5/24/2012				
Drafted By: lj \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\				
Case ID #: Pending) (Pending)				
Title: UGNAZI - UGNAZI; TEAM-DIVERSITY; DC GOV - VICTIM; COMPUTER INTRUSION - CRIMINAL				
Synopsis: Reporting AUSA's response.				
Details: On 5/17/2012, writer submitted a subpoena request for registrant information on wft.com to Assistant US Attorney for approval. On 5/24/2012, contact writer				
via telephone to advised prosecutor in Washington DC				
Writer will forward all the information on wtf.com intrusion to Detective telephone: , email: Long Beach				
Police Department for his case.				

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Da	te of transcription <u>06/08/2012</u>
From 5/2/2012 to 5/18/2012, through at and third party reporting, group UGNazi was involved in attacks on IC3.g Military Department website, ca.gov, Governme (gov.ia), visa.com, cia.gov, wtf.com, Discovery	twitter postings by writer learned hacker book book book book book book book boo
Pertaining to attack on wtf.com, wr domain lookup on wtf.com on 5/24/2012 and fin registration information:	
Registrant: Wtf, Inc. 4550 Ocala Drive Parma, OH 44134 US Administrative Contact, Technical Contact:	
Administrative Contact, Technical Contact:	b6
On 4/24/2012, telephone number: was interviewed via telephone. After being a of the interviewing agent and the nature of the provided the following information:	dvised of the identity
through Cox.net, when he contacted Cox, he forward was compromised, and call forwarding was setul forwarded to at tried to call himself, but instead of mail like it used to, he reported someone piddid not say anything. also recalled his Cox account was changed to an email begin	could not access his and his emails with internet services bund out his account up so all his call were seed up the call and a backup email for ming with a management account at registrant information talked with ext Network incident, ticket
Investigation on 6/5/2012 at Washington DC	(via facsimile) b7
File # Date die	
by SA	b6 b7

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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Continuation of FD-302 of	b6 b7C
created, as far as could recall, one was and the other was at UGNazi.com Inc. stated he has no relationship with any members of UGNazi and doesn't know why he was targeted. All of his accounts have since been reinstated.	ь6 в ^{ь7с}
is willing to provide the login logs for his Gmail and Network Solutions accounts.	ь6 ь7с

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
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Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/12/2012
To: Washington Field Attn: CY-4
From: Washington Field CY4/NVRA Contact: Approved By: Drafted By: Case ID #: (Pending)
Approved By: 20/12 MV/KCB
Drafted By:
Case ID #: (Pending)
Title: UGNAZI - UGNAZI; TEAM-DIVERSITY; DC GOV - VICTIM; COMPUTER INTRUSION - CRIMINAL
Synopsis: Reporting investigation conducted.
Details: On 6/7/2012, writer received an email with spreadsheet attachment named "Login History.xls" from Investigator at Network Solutions (NS), The spreadsheet contained login information for domain management account for wtf.com. NS released this information to the FBI upon receiving a written consent from the owner of the wtf.com, The following is the login history:
Login History for Account #
Date Success Person-Org ID IP Address Relationship

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Re:	06/12/2012	2
	IP address	resolved to
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logins,[There are three Person	on-Org ID associate with all the NS indicated these are the
		ed user personal information. unts are pending from NS.